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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals and Utah Code Annotated 78-4-11 (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BElLOW 
This Appeal is from a final Judgment of the Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FtOR REVIEW 
1. Did Diagnostics International, Inc. (hereaiter "Diagnostics"), have the 
right to cure the alleged defects of the blood circulation testing equipment pursuant to 
70A-2-508, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
2. Did Defendant-Respondent, Richard Uhl (hereafter "Uhl"), accept the 
equipment within the meaning of 70A-2-606(l)(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
STATUTES BELIEVED TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE RESPECTIVE ISSUES STATED 





Where any tender or delivery by the seller 
because non-conforming and the time 
has not yet expired, the seller may 
the buyer of his intention to cure and 




may then within 
Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming 
which the seller had reasonable grounds 
would be acceptable with or without money 
the seller may if he seasonably notifies 





the buyer have 
a conforming 
70A-2-508 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
70A-2-606. What constitutes acceptance of goods. 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are 
conforming or that he will take or retain them in 
spite of their nonconformity; or 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection 
(1) of section 70A-2-602), but such acceptance 
does not occur until the buyer has had a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or 
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership; but if such act is wrongful as against 
the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by 
him. 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is 
acceptance of that entire unit. 
70A-2-606 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Diagnostics sued Uhl to recover the sum of $4,595.00 owing on a 
Promissory Note which was given to Diagnostics to pay the balance due on an 
equipment purchase. Uhl counterclaimed against Diagnostics to recover the sum of 
$450.00, representing a down payment on the equipment and shipping costs to return the 
equipment to Diagnostics. 
The Trial of the case was held on July 22, 1985 before the Honorable 
Eleanor S. Van Sciver. 
The Court ruled that Uhl was entitled to a Judgment of no cause of action 
against Diagnostics on Diagnostics1 Complaint and that Diagnostics was entitled to a 
Judgment of no cause of action against Uhl on Uhl's Counterclaim. 
Diagnostics moved the Court for an Order amending the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, to set aside the Judgment and for a new Trial. On July 28, 
1987, the Court denied Diagnostics' motion and this appeal followed. 
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due, although on April 17, 
payment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties stipulated to most of the facts in this case at the beginning of 
the Trial. (Transcript of Trial, pp. 3, 4, 5 and 6.) 
On or about February 14, 1984, Diagnostics sold to Uhl a vasculizer (blood 
circulation testing equipment) for a purchase price of $4,995.00. Uhl paid $400.00 down 
and executed a Promissory Note for $4,595.00, which became due on April 14, 1984. 
The Promissory Note bears interest at the rate of eighteen per cent (18%) per annum. 
Uhl failed to pay the Promissory Note when 
1984, Diagnostics made demand of Uhl by certified mail for 
Uhl experienced problems with the finger prooe and the foot pedal on the 
first day he operated the equipment. The equipment itself operated properly. The 
finger probe and foot pedal are plugged into the vasculizer and can be removed and 
easily replaced. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions! of Law, entered March 13, 
1987, at p. 2.) 
On the same day he found out about the problems with the equipment, Uhl 
advised Diagnostics by telephone of the problems with the probe. Diagnostics advised 
Uhl in that conversation that the probe could be replaced v^ithin a matter of hours. Uhl 
told Diagnostics that he did not desire the defective parts to be replaced, and would not 
accept the equipment as he had purchased two other similar machines from another 
supplier. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
p. 2.) 
When Mr. Tarpey, president of Diagnostics, 
|, entered March 13, 1987, at 
permit him to send out replacement parts representing onty a minor fraction of the cost 
of the vasculizer, he advised Uhl that if he would return 
down payment would be refunded and the Promissory Noti cancelled. (R. 67, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 13, 1987, at 
learned that Uhl refused to 
the equipment, the $400.00 
p. 2.) 
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Uhl refused to return the equipment. Instead he told Diagnostics to refund 
his $400.00 down payment, and return the promissory note after which he would return 
the eqiupment. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 13, 
1984, at pp. 2, 3; Exhibit D-l, Letter to Diagnostics from Uhl.) 
Mr. Tarpey of Diagnostics did everything possible to resolve the dispute. 
Uhl admitted that Diagnostics had performed every agreement punctually that it made 
with him and that he had no good reason to believe that Diagnostics would not refund 
his money if he would return the equipment and had no reason to question Diagnostics1 
integrity. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44.) 
Diagnostics had no alternative but to sue on the Note after Uhlfs refusal to 
go along with either proposal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE 
70A-2-508O) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) defines a seller's 
right to cure a non-conforming tender. The seller may notify the buyer of his intent to 
cure and may then cure within the time of performance specified in the contract. 
70A-2-508(2) permits the seller to cure beyond the date set for seller's 
performance when three conditions are met. In order for this section to apply, (1) a 
buyer must have rejected a non-conforming tender; (2) the seller must have had 
reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable; and (3) the seller must 
have "seasonably" notified the buyer of the intention to substitute a conforming tender 
within a reasonable time. 
Upon satisfying those requirements, the seller is entitled to cure. 
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Uhl advised Diagnostics immediately that the lf*nger clip on the probe had 
failed and that the foot pedal was not working properly. 
wrong with the vasculizer itself. The probe was easily detachable from the vasculizer 
and could be replaced. It represented a very minor fraction 
There was clearly nothing 
of the value of the machine. 
In the same telephone conversation in which UJil advised Diagnostics of the 
problems, Diagnostics offered to replace the probe withinl a matter of hours, but Uhl 
told Diagnostics that he would not permit the defective prc^be to be replaced, as he had 
purchased two other similar machines from other sources. 
The defective probe represented only a mindr non-conforming tender by 
Diagnostics. Diagnostics' offer to replace the probe represented a good faith effort to 
make a conforming delivery within the contract time and fulfilled the requirement of 
seasonable notification to the buyer under 70A-2-508(1) Utjah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
01 auDsecuon (2) in that 
the vasculizer would be 
and Diagnostics offered to 
Diagnostics also fulfilled the requirments 
Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to believe" that 
acceptable. There were never any problems with the vasculizer itself. Uhl tested the 
equipment upon receipt and found it to be working properly. The only difficulty that 
Uhl experienced was with the finger clip on the probe 
replace that easily detachable item within a matter of hlours. Uhl refused to permit 
Diagnostics to cure the defect as required by the foregoing Section of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
POINT TWO 
Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) a buyer accepts the gbods when he "does any act 
inconsistent with the seller's ownership". Any action taken by the buyer, which is 
inconsistent with his claim that he has rejected the goods, constitutes an acceptance 
under paragraph (c). 
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When Uhl refused to permit Diagnostics to cure the defect under 
70A-2-508 and arbitrarily refused to return the equipment conceding that he had no 
reason for doing so, he exercised dominion over the vasculizer while at the same time 
proclaiming expressly that he was rejecting it. Under those facts, Uhl accepted the 
goods under 70A-2-606(l)(e) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
When Diagnostics learned of Uhl!s dissatisfaction with the equipment, it 
agreed to return the down payment and the promissory note if Uhl would return the 
equipment. Uhl stubbornly refused to return the equipment or permit Diagnostics to 
cure the minor defect. 
Uhl admitted that he had no good reason to believe that Diagnostics would 
not refund his money if he would return the equipment and that he had no reason to 
question Diagnostics1 integrity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DIAGNOSTICS HAD THE RIGHT TO CURE THE 
ALLEGED DEFECTS OF THE BLOOD CIRCULATION 
TESTING EQUIPMENT PURSUANT TO 70A-2-508, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, as amended) 
Uhl told Diagnostics when he ordered the blood circulation equipment that 
he needed it immediately because he had some tests scheduled. (Transcript of Trial, p. 
31) 
Diagnostics told Uhl that if he would send a certified check for $400.00 and 
a promissory note payable within sixty (60) days by Federal Express, Diagnostics would 
be able to have the equipment in his hands the next day. Uhl Federal Expressed the 
$400.00 certified check and the promissory note to Diagnostics and Diagnostics put the 
instrument on a plane and it was delivered to Uhl the next day. (Transcript of Trial, pp. 
8 & 9) 
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Upon receipt of the equipment, Uhl inspected i|t and determined that it was 
working properly. (Transcript of Trial, p. 34) 
On the first day that the equipment was used, Uhl experienced difficulty 
with the finger clip on the probe. He thereupon called diagnostics and reported the 
difficulties. (Transcript of trial, p. 35) 
Diagnostics offered to replace the probe within a matter of hours. Uhl 
advised Diagnostics that he had already bought two machines from another source and 
refused to permit Diagnostics to replace the defective probe. (Transcript of Trial, p. 17) 
The probe is an attachment to the vasculizer and has nothing to do with the 
instrument itself. Failure of the clip on the finger probe was a minor non-conforming 
defect that did not substantially impair the value of the vasculizer to Uhl. (Transcript 
of Trial, pp. 10 and 13) 
When Mr. Tarpey, president of Diagnostics learned that Uhl would not 
permit him to send a new probe and refused to accept and pay for the equipment he 
advised Uhl to return it and the down payment would be ijefunded and the promissory 
note returned. (Transcript of Trial, p. 17) 
Uhl thereupon told Diagnostics that he would riot return the machine until 
Diagnostics first refunded the down payment and returned the promissory note. Uhl 
followed up on that telephone conversation with a letter to Diagnostics reiterating what 
was said in the telephone conversation. (Transcript of Trial, pp. 19 and 20) 
Uhl testified that he had no good reason to belfeve that Diagnostics would 
not refund his money if he would return the equipment. 
Q Isn't it a fact that he had performed punctually 
every agreement that you made with him? 
A Well, I think t h a t -
Q Is that or is that not true? 
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A As a businessman would do, I feel that he did 
what a business—a person in business would do, yes. 
Q So, you really have no good reason to believe 
that he wouldn't refund your money? 
A. No. ITm not questioning his integrity or 
anything like that. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44) 
70A-2-508O) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) gives Diagnostics 
the right to cure the non-conforming tender of the blood circulation testing equipment. 
The draftsmenfs comment clarifies the meaning of the foregoing section: 
Purposes: 
1. Subsection (1) permits a seller who has made a 
non-conforming tender in any case to make a conforming 
delivery within the contract time upon seasonable 
notification to the buyer. It applies even where the seller has 
taken back the non-conforming goods and refunded the 
purchase price. He may still make a good tender within the 
contract period. The closer, however, it is to the contract 
date, the greater is the necessity for extreme promptness on 
the seller's part in notifying of his intention to cure, if such 
notification is to be "seasonable" under this subsection. 
The rule of this subsection, moreover, is qualified by its 
underlying reasons. Thus if, after contracting for June 
delivery, a buyer later makes known to the seller his need for 
shipment early in the month and the seller ships accordingly, 
the "contract time" has been cut down by the supervening 
modification and the time for cure of tender must be 
referred to this modified time term. 
2. Subsection (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by 
reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer. However, the 
Seller is not protected unless he had "reasonable grounds to 
believe" that the tender would be acceptable. Such 
reasonable gounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of 
performance or usage of trade as well as in the particular 
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract. The 
seller is charged with commercial knowledge of any factors 
in a particular sales situation which require him to comply 
strictly with his obligations under the contract as, for 
example, strict conformity of documents in an overseas 
shipment or the sale of precision parts or chemicals for use in 
manufacture. Further, if the buyer gives notice either 
implicitly, as by a prior course of dealing involving rigorous 
inspections, or expressly, as by the deliberate inclusion of a 
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"no replacement" clause in the contract, the [seller is to be 
held to rigid compliance. If the clause appears in a "form" 
contract evidence that it is out of line wth trade usage or the 
prior course of dealing and was not called 10 the sellerTs 
attention may be sufficient to show that the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the tender would be 
acceptable. 
3. The words "a further reasonable time to substitute a 
conforming tender" are intended as words of limitation to 
protect the buyer. What is a "reasonable timer depends upon 
the attending circumstances. Compare Section 2-511 on the 
comparable case of a seller's surprise dem|and for legal 
tender. 
4. Existing trade usages permitting variations without 
rejection but with price allowance enter into nie agreement 
itself as contractual limitations of remedy and are not 
covered by this section. 
Diagnostics demonstrated that it was able to ship equipment to Uhl and 
have it in his possession the day after the order was Placed. When Uhl advised 
Diagnostics of the difficulties with the finger clip on the ptobe, Diagnostics offered to 
replace the probe within a matter of hours but Uhl refused | to permit Diagnostics to do 
so. 
Diagnostics is required to "make a conforming delivery within the contract 
time upon seasonable notification to the buyer". Under the foregoing section of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, having offered to replace thd probe within a matter of 
hours, it cannot be argued by Uhl that Diagnostics was not in a position to perform 
within the contract time. "Seasonable notification" was given by Diagnostics to Uhl 
that Diagnostics would be in a position to make a conforming delivery of the probe 
within a matter of hours. Notification was given by Diagnostics to Uhl of the offer to 
make a conforming delivery in the same conversation in which Uhl advised Diagnostics 
of the difficulties he was having with the equipment. 
The promptness on Diagnostics' part in notifyiiig of its intention to cure is 
"seasonable" within the meaning of the foregoing sectionL 70A-2-508(2) Utah Code 
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Annotated (1953, as amended) requires that Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to 
believe" that the tender of the blood circulation equipment would be acceptable. Upon 
receipt of the equipment, Uhl tested it and found it to be working properly. Uhl knew 
that Diagnostics manufactured new blood testing equipment. It can, therefore, be said 
that Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the tender of the vasculizer 
would be acceptable to Uhl. 
Uhl flatly refused to permit Diagnostics to exercise its rights under the 
foregoing sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. Diagnostics1 right to cure was 
unconditional at the time Uhl refused Diagnostics offer to replace the probe. 
In Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 434 
NYS2d 623 (Sup Ct, 1980) defendant contracted to buy a cargo of oil represented as 
having a sulfur content of .5%. Defendant rejected the oil when it was reported by an 
independent tester as having a higher sulfur content. The court ruled that defendant 
was required to accept a proffered cure of defective delivery in the form of a 
substitute conforming shipment scheduled to arrive one week later. The court further 
held that the defendant was liable to the seller for the loss occasioned by its refusal to 
accept the oil. 
The sellerTs right to cure is unconditional within the time set for 
performance in the contract. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 NJ 277, 440 A2d 1345 (1982). 
In Uchitel v. F. R. Tripler & Co., 434 NYS2d 77 (NY Sup Ct, 1980) plaintiff 
brought an action for breach of warranty based upon some alleged defects in garments. 
The court stated that Section 2-508 provides an exception to the requirement of an 
immediate perfect tender. A seller is permitted to cure an initial impoper tender and if 
a buyer unreasonably refuses to permit a seller to exercise this right to cure, no breach 
of warranty action premised on the defect sought to be cured may be maintained. In 
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the foregoing case, the defendant had peremptorily refusedl defendant seller a chance to 
cure defects in missized and misfitted garments. 
A seller should have recourse to the relief afforded by Section 2-508(2) as 
long as it can establish that it had reasonable grounds, tested objectively and in 
accordance with UCC standards, to believe that the goods would be accepted. T.W. Oil, 
Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 57 NY^d 574, 457 NYS2d 458, 443 
NE2d 932(1982). 
In Traynor v. Walters, 342 F Supp 455 (DCMD Pa., 1972) the buyer of 
Christmas trees had rejected on December 8 and December 14 two deliveries of 
non-conforming Scotch Pines. An offer by the seller to cure both of the 
non-conforming deliveries which was communicated to the| buyer on December 14 was 
seasonable under UCC § 2-508(1). 
In Reese v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 184 SE2d 7J22 (1971) the court held that 
under the provisions of § 2-508 the manufacturer of a new automobile was entitled to 
an opportunity to correct minor defects in the body of the car and the buyer who did 
not accept the manufacturer's offer to make the repair^ free of charge could not 
rescind the contract of sale claiming breach of warranty. 
UhlTs refusal to permit Diagnostics to cure thd minor defect in the finger 
clip on the probe of the vasculizer was unreasonable under the circumstances and he is 
liable to Diagnostics for the purchase price of the equipment. The evidence is clear 
that Uhl peremptorily refused to permit Diagnostics to cure the defects on the probe. 
Even though he rejected the vasculizer, the rejection did not discharge the contract and 
he should be held liable for the contract price of the equipment. 
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POINT TWO 
UHL ACCEPTED THE EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF 70A-2-606(l)(c) UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953, as amended) 
Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) a buyer 
accepts the goods when he "does any act inconsistent with the sellers ownership." In 
this case, Uhl exercised dominion over the vasculizer conceding that he had no good 
reason to do so. At the same time, he proclaimed expressly that he had rejected the 
equipment. Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) he has accepted the goods. 
The official comment to this section states: 
. . . . 4. Under paragraph (c), any action taken by the buyer, 
which is inconsistent with his claim that he has rejected the 
goods, constitutes an acceptance. However, the provisions of 
paragraph (c) are subject to the sections dealing with 
rejection by the buyer which permit the buyer to take certain 
actions with respect to the goods pursuant to his options and 
duties imposed by those sections, without effecting an 
acceptance of the goods. The second clause of paragraph (c) 
modifies some of the prior case law and makes it clear that 
"acceptance" in law based on the wrongful act of the 
acceptor is acceptance only as against the wrongdoer and 
then only at the option of the party wronged. 
In the same manner in which a buyer can bind himself, 
despite his insistence that he is rejecting or has rejected the 
goods, by an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership 
under paragraph (c), he can obligate himself by a 
communication of acceptance despite a prior rejection under 
paragraph (a). However, the sections on buyer's rights on 
improper delivery and on the effect of rightful rejection, 
make it clear that after he once rejects a tender, paragraph 
(a) does not operate in favor of the buyer unless the seller has 
re-tendered the goods or has taken affirmative action 
indicating that he is holding the tender open. 
The receipt and retention of goods tendered by delivery have been held 
sufficient to constitute an acceptance under Section 2-606(l)(a) J.L. Teel Co., Inc. v. 
Houston United States, Inc., 491 So 2d 851 (Miss, 1986) also see Ho v. Wolfe, 688 SW2d 
693 (Tex App, 1985). 
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Uhl received and retained possession of the v&sculizer when he conceded 
that he had no good reason to do so. He refused Diagnostics offer to cure the minor 
non-conforming tender. When Diagnostics agreed that Uhl could return the equipment, 
he refused even though he admitted that he had no reason to believe that Diagnostics 
would not refund his own down payment and return the promissory note. 
Having exercised dominion over the goods, he accepted them within the 
meaning of Section 2-606(1 )(c) and obligated himself to pay the contract rate for the 
goods accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the facts of this case, the applicable statutes and case law, 
Diagnostics had the unconditional right to cure the minor non-conforming tender of the 
vasculizer. Uhl arbitrarily refused to permit Diagnostics to pffect a cure. 
Uhl!s actions in exercising dominion over the 
retaining it were inconsistent with his claim that he had rejected the machine. These 
actions constituted an acceptance of the vasculizer. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Diagnostics relspectfully requests that the 
lower court's decision be reversed and that judgment pe entered against Uhl in 
accordance with the relief sought in the Complaint. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1987. 
equipment and unjustifiably 
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